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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, it has been argued that overbroad laws chill pro-
tected expression because they reach conduct that is beyond the scope
of permissible regulation.1 Similarly, vague laws can chill protected
conduct because in the absence of an articulated standard, it cannot be
predicted with any certainty whether protected conduct is respected
by the enforcing governmental unit. When an overbroad and/or vague
law is passed, the legislature has abdicated its duty to set standards to
those whose duty it is to enforce laws, and vests the enforcers with the
power to establish the standards. Even when the police do not offend
the political majority in the way they interpret their implied grant of
interpretive authority, the very act of interpretation by enforcement
personnel offends the most basic political concepts on which our coun-
try was founded. When our government has become one more of men
than of laws; when one rule of law applies to the unfortunate, the
powerless, or the non-conforming, but not to others; when the funda-
mental rights guaranteed to all citizens are ignored in favor of some
vague goals of community peace and tranquility, we look to the judici-
1. M. NImMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH-A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.11 (1984).
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ary to realign the operation of powers on which our freedoms ulti-
mately depend.
Overbreadth analysis, and the logically related analysis of vague-
ness, were developed as methods of scrutinizing perceived statutory
infirmities in order to determine whether judicial intervention is ap-
propriate. When these tools are given lip-service but are not applied
in good faith or with consistency, they cannot perform the function for
which they were created. Many believe that these tools were abused
in the past, but this does not indicate that they should be abandoned,
only that they should be used with greater care and circumspection.
In State v. Groves,2 the Nebraska Supreme Court entertained an
overbreadth challenge raised against the disorderly conduct ordinance
of the City of Omaha as though it did not comprehend the nature of
that challenge. When the judiciary will not intervene to declare a law
overbroad or vague simply because it believes that the individual who
raises the challenge is a bad person, our government has the opportu-
nity to become as evil and repressive as unlimited power can lead it to
be. Americans should be morally offended by a standardless rule of
law that is applied on an arbitrary basis. When the judiciary allows
that result, all three branches of government have aligned themselves
against the people.
This Article demonstrates that rather than misapplying over-
breadth analysis, the court in Groves did not apply it at all. It suggests
that courts should require that legislatures articulate the goals they
seek when they regulate speech based on its content combined with
the time, place and manner in which the speech is delivered. Finally,
the Article argues that few, if any, disorderly conduct laws are neces-
sary or desirable, and that these statutes are not constitutional either
in intent or application.
II. STATE V. GROVES
A. Facts
Appellant Kevin R. Groves was convicted on December 9, 1983, of
disorderly conduct as defined in the Omaha Municipal Code.3 The
conviction of Groves arose out of an incident that occurred during the
early morning hours of October 5, 1983, at a Holiday Inn in Omaha.
2. 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
3. It shall be unlawful for any person purposely or knowingly to cause in-
convenience, annoyance or alarm or create a risk thereof to any person
by:
a) engaging in fighting, threatening or violent conduct; or
b) using abusive, threatening, or other fighting language or gestures;
or
c) making unreasonable noise.
OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 20-42 (1980).
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Omaha Police Officer Edward Hale was moonlighting as a private se-
curity guard. Hale's duties included patrolling the parking lot in a
pickup.4 At approximately 3:40 a.m., Hale noticed Groves in the motel
parking lot, standing next to a parked vehicle.5 He saw a pair of
boltcutters in Groves pocket. When Hale was within about ten feet of
Groves, Groves began to walk away from the vehicle. Wishing to in-
vestigate the reason for the man's presence, Hale identified himself as
a police officer.6 Groves responded with the query, "What the fuck do
you want?" 7 At Hale's request for identification, Groves produced his
driver's license.
Groves walked toward Hale remarking, "I don't give a fuck who
you are."'8 Hale felt it was necessary to draw his weapon in response
to what he later described as Groves' menacing manner. At trial, Hale
acknowledged there were no overt gestures made by Groves that gave
the officer cause to draw his gun.9
Upon seeing the drawn weapon, Groves began walking toward his
own automobile parked some forty feet away.10 Hale radioed the
Omaha Police Department for assistance, and several police cruisers
responded approximately eight minutes later.
In the meantime, Groves moved his car next to the Hale vehicle.
He taunted Hale, calling him a "motherfucker" and a "pig" and daring
Hale to arrest him single-handedly. At trial, Hale admitted that police
officers are not infrequently subjected to this type of verbal abuse.11
The criminality of addressing a police officer in this manner, however,
was a point of contention in the opinions filed in Groves.1 2
During this period before the on-duty officers arrived, Hale noticed
that Groves was carrying a "buck knife" in a sheath on his belt.
Though convicted of disorderly conduct, Groves was acquitted of
charges of carrying a concealed weapon and trespassing.13
When on-duty Omaha police officers arrived, Groves referred to
one of them, Officer Michael Cavanaugh, as a "fuckhead."14 Groves
was forcibly handcuffed by Cavanaugh and another officer.' 5
Groves was convicted of disorderly conduct in Omaha Municipal
4. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 383-84, 363 N.W.2d 507, 509 (1985).
5. Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
6. Id.
7. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 384, 363 N.W.2d 507, 509 (1985).
8. Id.
9. Brief for Appellant at 5, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
10. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 384, 363 N.W.2d 507, 509 (1985).
11. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
12. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 395, 363 N.W.2d 507, 515 (1985) (Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting).
13. Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
14. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 384, 363 N.W.2d 507, 509 (1985).
15. Brief for Appellee at 3, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
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Court. The court denied Groves' contention that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and sentenced Groves to sev-
enty-five days. The District Court modified the sentence to twenty
days, finding the ordinance not unconstitutional, "at least not in its
entirety."6
B. Holding
On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, Groves raised two as-
signments of error. First, he contended that the ordinance criminal-
ized protected conduct under both the United States and Nebraska
Constitutions and was therefore overbroad. Second, he contended
that the ordinance was vague in failing to give adequate notice of pro-
hibited conduct and in lending itself to arbitrary enforcement.
The court, in an opinion by Justice White, began its analysis with
State v. Frey.17 Frey was a criminal case which, unlike Groves, did not
involve first amendment issues. Frey applied Hoffman Estates v. FKip-
side, Hoffman Estates'8 as the measure of standing to challenge the
overbreadth and vagueness of a law.19
Applying Hoffman Estates, the court first held that the Omaha dis-
orderly conduct statute was not overbroad because it did not reach a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.2 0 Without
explicit reference to the circumstances, the court held the words
"fuckhead" and "motherfucker" to be fighting words.21 Turning to
the vagueness challenge, the court held that under Frey the appellant
lacked standing to raise a facial vagueness challenge to the statute
since the statute constitutionally prohibited his conduct.22
In dissent, Chief Justice Krivosha took issue with every aspect of
the majority's opinion. He first argued that Hoffman Estates did not
reflect Nebraska law, and had effectively been overruled by the
Supreme Court's later decision in Kolender v. Lawson.23 The Chief
Justice first argued that Hoffman Estates involved a civil statute that
regulated commercial speech.24 More important, Hoffman Estates
16. Brief for Appellant at 1, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985)
(quoting record).
17. 218 Neb. 558, 357 N.W.2d 216 (1984).
18. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
19. State v. Frey, 218 Neb. 558, 561, 357 N.W.2d 216, 219 (1985).
20. Id.
21. At this point the court was clearly discussing the merits of Mr. Groves' case,
rather than addressing the appellant's contention that the statute was overbroad
as it applied to parties not before the court. See infra text accompanying notes
55-72.
22. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 386, 363 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1985).
23. 461 U.S. 352 (1983)




had been "abandoned"25 in Kolender. Kolender was a highly publi-
cized case involving a black man who had been arrested at least fifteen
times in California for refusing to produce what California police of-
ficers considered reliable identification.2 6 The Court stated that "the
statute as it has been construed is unconstitutionally vague within the
meaning of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a sus-
pect provide a 'credible and reliable' identification."2 7 The Krivosha
dissent noted that the statute had been held to be facially vague
although it was clearly not vague in all of its applications.28 The Hoff-
man Estates case, in addition to being distinct on its facts, is thus "an
anomaly in the law and, as an anomaly, should be disregarded." 29
The dissent then focused on the preliminary language in the stat-
ute and argued that it rendered the statute facially vague.30 The Chief
Justice argued that the words "fuckhead" and "motherfucker" could
not be fighting words per se, because words take on a fighting charac-
ter only with reference to the circumstances in which they are used.31
Suggesting that "lilt is difficult to imagine how one could draft an ordi-
nance more vague than the one under consideration,"3 2 the dissent
discussed the traditionally recognized danger of vague laws, including
lack of fair notice and the potential for arbitrary enforcement.3 3 The
opinion argued that the majority could not construe the ordinance
without also construing the particularly vague subsection (c)34 since
Groves had been charged under all three sections of the ordinance.
Thus, the Court could not be certain that the appellant had been con-
victed on constitutional grounds.35
The Chief Justice also argued that the evidence did not support a
conviction on the merits.
It is difficult for me to conceive how an officer, with a drawn, loaded service
revolver, who is being specifically paid by a private business to provide secur-
ity of the type that the officer was providing at the moment the altercation
occurred, could be either inconvenienced, annoyed, or alarmed by a man with
a foul mouth.
3 6
25. I& at 389, 363 N.W.2d at 512.
26. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 354-55 (1983).
27. Id at 353-54.
28. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 389, 363 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1985) (Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting).
29. Id. at 391, 363 N.W.2d at 513.
30. Id. at 391-95, 363 N.W.2d at 513-15.
31. Id. at 392, 363 N.W.2d at 513.
32. Id. at 393, 362 N.W.2d at 514.
33. Id at 392-93, 363 N.W.2d at 513-14.
34. See supra note 3.
35. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 394, 363 N.W.2d 507, 515 (1985).
36. Id at 395, 363 N.W.2d at 515 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
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III. BACKGROUND OF OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
The practice of allowing defendants who are within the "hard
core" of a statute, in the sense that their conduct can be constitution-
ally restricted, to challenge the impermissibly broad sweep of the stat-
ute as to other parties not before the court is generally thought to
have begun in Thornhill v. Alabama.37 Allowing an individual whose
conduct can be constitutionally punished to litigate the constitutional
rights of others is an exception to traditional standing doctrine. 38
Standing to raise the right of another, or jus tertii, is limited on the
ground that the party before the court may not be the best proponent
of another's rights.39 The courts seek to ensure that the party has
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions ...."40 When the party raising the chal-
lenge risks criminal punishment under a law which arguably restricts
the rights of others, as in Groves, it seems less likely that that party
will be lax in asserting those rights. To be sure, if the law is found
invalid, the accused must be set free.41
When the allegedly restricted rights are those guaranteed under
the first amendment, even weightier considerations arise. The courts
then must concern themselves with the "chilling" effect that a sweep-
ingly overbroad or vague standard may have on the exercise of rights
to free speech and association. "These freedoms are delicate and vul-
nerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual ap-
plication of sanctions."4 2
Recognizing that broadly worded laws have the potential for
preventing the exercise of legitimate constitutional rights is not diffi-
cult. The inherent problem in the overbreadth area is discerning how
much protected activity must be reached by the statute for it to be
overbroad and therefore facially invalid. During the 1960's, the War-
ren Court was criticized for allowing overbreadth standing too fre-
quently. The Court often refused to accept the opinions of other
governmental entities on the constitutionality of their own actions.43
In what was perhaps a question-begging response to those criti-
37. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
38. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
39. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-17 (1976).
40. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1961).
41. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); State v. Hamilton, 215 Neb. 694,
340 N.W.2d 397 (1983).
42. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
43. See A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTrrUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF REFORM 19-20 (1968).
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cisms, the Burger Court, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,44 purported to
limit overbreadth analysis in certain contexts. The court merely re-
stated what had always been the crux of the inquiry:45 "To put the
matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely
speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the stat-
ute's plainly legitimate sweep."46
Broadrick represented a vague attempt by the Court to restrict its
own power to render state and federal statutes facially invalid due to
poor draftsmanship, including inadequate attention to constitutional
concerns. The Broadrick distinction between conduct and speech has
been of little or no significance.47 Courts, however, continue to re-
quire "substantial" overbreadth.4
8
Determining whether the overbreadth of a law is "substantial" re-
44. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
45. Id. at 630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 615.
47. Any standing rule that purports to distinguish between speech and conduct is of
little help to lower courts since speech as used in the first amendment obviously
includes many forms of conduct. "As this Court has repeatedly stated, these [first
amendment] rights are not confined to verbal expression." Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966). See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 66 (1981) (nude dancing "not without its First Amendment protections from
official regulation"); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (street theater
critical of armed involvement in Vietnam could not be restricted on basis of con-
tent alone); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
505 (1969) (wearing of black armbands by high school students to protest Vietnam
conflict was "the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment").
The court has, of course, restricted expressive conduct where nonexpressive
elements of the conduct seriously harm government interests unrelated to the
suppression of citizen opinions. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) (Court found prevention of damage to public
parks made preventing set-up of "Reaganville" in Washington, D.C. park a rea-
sonable time, place and manner restriction); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 381 (1968) (government can punish burning of draft cards because doing so
"furthers the smooth and proper function of the system Congress has established
to raise armies"). One commentator has suggested that the distinction made in
Broadrick might be defensible if it had been one between expression (rather than
speech, which implies verbal communication in its ordinary sense) and conduct.
Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 548-49
(1974). At any rate, the Court seems to have dropped the distinction and focused
on perhaps the equally troublesome "substantiality" question. See, e.g., New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See generally M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EX-
PRE:SSION-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 248-55 (1984).
48. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794, 2802 (1985) ("If the
overbreadth is 'substantial,' the law may not be enforced against anyone, includ-
ing the party before the court, until it is narrowed to reach only unprotected




quires a relative rather than absolute inquiry.4 9 In other words, a law
that properly reaches 5,000 punishable acts but includes 50 protected
acts is not considered substantially overbroad. On the other hand, a
law that reaches 50 punishable acts and 50 protected acts would (it is
hoped) be substantially overbroad, although it would seem that the
two laws reach the identical number of protected acts.
50
One of the persistent problems in overbreadth analysis is that the
numbers hypothesized here are unavailable. In close cases, judges
must rely on their own subjective values as well as their sense of how
laws are actually enforced. Given the expressed viewpoints of some
members of the Burger Court on the relative importance of first
amendment values, it is not surprising that the "substantiality" re-
quirement of Broadrick has operated to restrict constitutional jus ter-
tii standing in this context.5 '
Another continuing problem in the first amendment overbreadth
area has been the Court's willful confusion of overbreadth with vague-
ness.52 The Court has held that in order for a defendant to raise the
vagueness of a statutory standard as to third parties not before the
court, the defendant must show that the statute is vague in all of its
aspects.5 3 This really means that the defendant is precluded from
facially challenging the statute. If the statute were truly vague in all
of its aspects, the defendant could prove the statute was vague as ap-
plied, since its application to him indisputably involves at least one of
the operative elements of the statute. Thus, the only situation in
which a statute is likely to be declared facially vague is when no one
49. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) ("Yet we seriously doubt, and it has
not been suggested, that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute
amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach.").
50. M. REDISH, supra note 47, at 250-55. Professor Redish notes that the Court's im-
plicit justification for concerning itself with relative rather than absolute over-
breadth is that a statute which constitutionally punishes a great deal of conduct is
more necessary than one which reaches much less criminal activity in relation to
its unconstitutional sweep. Id. at 252. The effect of this assumption is to avoid
the critical question in overbreadth cases: whether a less intrusive means could
have served the state's goals.
51. In a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Powell, Jus-
tice Rebnquist remarked: "One might as a matter of original inquiry question
whether an overbreadth challenge should ever be allowed, given that the Declar-
atory Judgment Act and the availability of preliminary injunctive relief will usu-
ally permit a litigant to discover the scope of constitutional protection afforded
his activity without subjecting himself to criminal prosecution." Secretary of
State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2858 (1984). These
offhand suggestions are so impracticable as to indicate that their author believes
the rights of citizens to be nothing more than an annoyance.
52. Justice White accuses the majority of willfully confusing the two areas in his dis-
sent in Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1865 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
53. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982).
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has been charged with its violation.54
With the void-for-vagueness doctrine essentially unavailable to a
defendant charged under a sweeping, standardless law, the only
chance for the defendant to attack the constitutionality of the statute
is to convince the court that the statute is substantially overbroad. A
close reading of Groves would suggest that it may be impossible to con-
vince the Nebraska Supreme Court that a law is overbroad; at best it is
an alternative defense in only certain cases for certain types of defend-
ants. In contrast to the shallow deference given personal rights in its
Groves decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court should focus more
closely on the individual interests at stake in cases requiring over-
breadth analysis.
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. GROVES
The Nebraska Supreme Court failed to address the issue posed by
the appellant in State v. Groves. Groves involved a facial challenge to
the Omaha disorderly conduct ordinance.55 This means that, at least
for purposes of argument, Groves was willing to concede that his con-
duct was not protected under the first amendment. This type of chal-
lenge removes from the court's analysis the conduct of the individual
challenger and focuses instead on the ordinance itself. The rights that
were being vindicated were the rights of those who might unnecessa-
rily restrict themselves from otherwise protected activity in the
knowledge that the Omaha police were armed with sweeping, unde-
fined powers to suppress whomever they might please. Put this way,
the question was not whether Groves could be properly jailed for call-
ing a police officer a "fuckhead" in an isolated parking lot. The ques-
tion was whether the ordinance reached so much constitutionally
protected activity that it must be struck down.56 The rationale of
overbreadth scrutiny rests on a recognition that the actual application
of overbroad laws against privileged activity is not their only vice.
Rather, the doctrine emphasizes the need to eliminate an overbroad
law's deterrent impact-or "chilling effect"-on protected activity.5 7
Several Nebraska cases support this approach. In State v. Adkinss8
the court struck down as overbroad a statute that made it a crime "to
visit or be in any room, dwelling house, vehicle, or place where any
controlled substance is being used . . .if the person has knowledge
54. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839
(1984).
55. Brief for Appellant at 10, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
56. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 4.11[A].
57. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 853
(1970).
58. 196 Neb. 76, 241 N.W.2d 655 (1976).
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that such activity is occurring."59 The court did not discuss the "mea-
ger" facts of the record before it.60 Instead, the court considered the
innocent acts of parties not before it which were made criminal by the
act.6 '
This facial approach to the statute itself is recognized as a peculiar
strength of overbreadth analysis. "The difficulties of perceiving rele-
vant facts on cold and perhaps unilluminating records containing con-
tradictory testimony largely vitiate the hope that higher courts may
reliably correct errors below and provide systematic guidance to trial
courts."6 2 Disorderly conduct cases are especially sensitive to factual
determination since they are typically emotionally charged and fre-
quently turn on subjective interpretations of the significance of partic-
ular actions.63
Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of assessing the constitu-
tionality of a law in the abstract, they were not encountered in Groves
because the court did not go beyond the merits of the case before it.
The court proposed the inquiry- "whether or not the enactment
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionality protected con-
duct"6 4-- and then proceeded to quote State v. Boss65 regarding the
fighting words doctrine.66 The quote was ostensibly used as authority
59. Id. at 77, 241 N.W.2d at 656.
60. I- at 78, 241 N.W.2d at 656.
61. Individuals may find themselves in situations such as at parties, theaters,
dance halls, hotel lobbies, buses, apartments, taxis, or even in private
automobiles, where their conduct has no relation to the acts of others
who may be disposed to use controlled drugs. In such situations, must
they either immediately leave because of fear of prosecution under the
statute under consideration; or perhaps force the others to discontinue
the use of the controlled substance; or perhaps have the others ar-
rested ....
... What if a person were engaged in a constitutionally protected
activity, such as attending a public meeting or voting, when he inadver-
tently discovers that another at the meeting or at the polls is in posses-
sion of a controlled substance?
1d. at 79-80, 241 N.W.2d at 657. State v. Adkins can be criticized for not articulat-
ing the constitutional rights threatened by the law's overbreadth (presumably
freedom of association), but the approach of the case is otherwise correct.
62. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 868
(1970).
63. The Harvard Note, id., points to the differing interpretations of the same record
in the majority and dissenting opinions in disorderly conduct cases. In Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), Justice Stewart described the peaceable na-
ture of the petitioners' protest. '"Tere was no violence or threat of violence on
their part." Ia at 236. Justice Clark disagreed. "It is my belief that anyone con-
versant with the almost spontaneous combustion in some Southern communities
in such a situation will agree that the City Manager's action may well have
averted a major catastrophe." Id at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting).
64. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 385, 363 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1985).
65. 195 Neb. 467, 238 N.W.2d 639 (1976).
66. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 385, 363 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1985).
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for the court's rehabilitation of the ordinance, but it was anomalous to
attempt to construe the statute after considering its constitutional-
ity.6 7 The constitutionality of the statute clearly rests upon its
construction.
If the statute was improperly construed by the trial court, the
Supreme Court could not simply read the statute properly (assuming
that were possible) and affirm the conviction. The jury convicted the
appellant on the basis of the trial judge's explanation of the law, and
the conviction should have been affirmed, if at all, on that ground
alone. Any narrower reading by an appellate court, through perhaps
rescuing the statute, does not help the appellant. If the jury was told
that the defendant's conduct need merely be annoying, the conviction
could not be saved under the harmless error doctrine. Overbreadth
analysis seeks to avoid judicial usurpation of the legislative function
by avoiding such strained construction of defective statutes. By con-
centrating on the well-settled fighting words doctrine, the court obfus-
cated the question of whether the overbreadth of the ordinance was
substantial in its entirety.
In the next paragraph, presumably still applying its exceptionally
narrow overbreadth analysis, the court held that the words
"fuckhead" and "motherfucker" were fighting words.6 8 The opinion
rejected what it called "the implicit argument advanced by appellant"
that police officers are unlikely to react violently to abusive language.
The court was so concerned with "implicit" arguments that it did not
analyze the appellant's explicit overbreadth argument.
6 9
The court had good reason to be insecure about the merits of its
approach,70 but its insistence that the statute was broad enough to en-
67. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
68. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 386, 363 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1985). Perhaps Chief Jus-
tice Krivosha's reading of this part of the opinion is too literal. ('"The majority
has determined that the words 'fuckhead' and 'motherfucker' are fighting words
per se." I& at 392, 363 N.W.2d at 513 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting)). Given the
context, a more natural reading might be that the language was punishable under
all the circumstances. Still, one would hope the court would be more careful in
these sensitive areas. To make a word illegal, regardless of context, is blatant
censorship. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (disorderly conduct conviction
reversed where protester's colorful remark was not directed at anyone in particu-
lar). "It hardly needs repeating that '[t]he constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within
"narrowly limited classes of speech."' " I& at 107 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972)); Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (up-
holding FCC sanctions of radio station for playing George Carlin's "Filthy
Words" monologue, proving "it is broadcasting that has received the most limited
First Amendment protection").
69. Brief for Appellant at 10, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
70. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 395, 363 N.W.2d 507, 515 (1985) (Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting). ("It is difficult for me to conclude that this evidence was sufficient to
establish inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm of a man who is being paid to be
[Vol. 65:584
OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
compass these facts made the appellant's point in ironic fashion. The
court analyzed the statute as though the statute specifically pertained
to verbal abuse of police officers.71 In fact, the court found itself
struggling with a law so broad that it was nearly impossible to discern
the intent of the lawmaker. The court, rather than addressing the
question of whether the statute was sufficiently narrow to serve gov-
ernmental interests without needlessly chilling free speech, seemed to
say "Yes, this law is certainly broad enough to take in this kind of rude
and distasteful behavior." Rather than addressing the issue raised, the
court ironically proved how sorely overbreadth analysis is needed.
Yet the court obviously misunderstood the concept of a facial chal-
lenge. "As Groves' conduct is not constitutionally protected, the over-
breadth argument must be rejected."72 In one sentence, the court
went to the heart of its own error.
As has been asserted throughout this Article, first amendment
overbreadth standing is unusual because its scope transcends the con-
duct of the individual before the court and focuses instead on abstract
concerns about what effect the law may have on the constitutionally
protected conduct of other citizens. Mr. Groves' conduct is irrelevant
to the inquiry of whether the ordinance is overly broad. Clearly the
court misunderstood the nature of overbreadth analysis when it fo-
cused on the offensive conduct described in the record.
Once it had clumsily side-stepped the overbreadth question, the
court proceeded to the vagueness issue. Here the court acquiesced in
one of the United States Supreme Court's most cowardly revisions of
due process. When the United States Supreme Court says that "[t]o
succeed ... the complainant must demonstrate that the law is imper-
inconvenienced, annoyed, or alarmed, and therefore permitted to carry a loaded
revolver.").
71. Compare Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), in which the statute held
facially invalid read: "It shall be unlawful and a breach of the peace for any per-
son wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward
or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual perform-
ance of his duty." Id- at 132. The Lewis statute was overbroad, but the govern-
ment interests it protects are arguably more circumscribed than those the Omaha
ordinance serves, assuming they can even be identified. In his dissent in Lewis,
Justice Blackmun identified those interests:
In the interest of the arrested person who could become the victim of
police overbearance, and in the interest of the officer, who must antici-
pate violence and who, like the rest of us, is fallibly human, legislatures
have enacted laws of the kind challenged in this case to serve a legiti-
mate social purpose and to restrict only speech that is "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
[it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Id- at 141 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 386, 363 N.W.2d 507, 510, (1985).
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missibly vague in all of its applications,"73 it is denying criminal de-
fendants an opportunity to mount a facial challenge to the law. If the
law is vague in all of its applications, the defendant has no need to
invoke the rights of others to escape punishment. One of the applica-
tions of a statute is the application to the defendant. If the law is
vague in all of its applications, as Hoffman Estates requires, the de-
fendant may simply show that the law is vague as applied to him.
Only the most altruistic defendant, or at least one more generous than
the Hoffman Estates Court envisioned, would bother to vindicate the
rights of teeming hordes of hypothetical citizens. The Hoffman Es-
tates test removes what was a legitimate incentive for defendants to
clarify the law through facial challenges. If a defendant is otherwise
arguably guilty of a crime, but the statute is vague in the majority of
its applications, he has no standing to raise the rights of others who
might be harmed. The law is not vague in all its applications if it has
managed to catch him. On the other hand, if the law is vague in all its
applications, it is certainly vague as applied to any one defendant. Un-
less he has a burning desire to warm over the chilling effect the stat-
ute has had on the constitutional rights of people he does not know,
the defendant will simply challenge the vagueness of the law as it is
applied to himself. Under this reasoning, a defendant will either not
have standing, or will not be motivated, to raise a facial challenge to an
overbroad statute.
In Hoffman Estates,74 the Court eliminated the opportunity of the
guilty to raise the careless drafting of the legislature as a complete
defense to the crime. The motivations behind eliminating that prac-
tice are evident. Many crimes simply do not lend themselves to easy
and precise prohibition.75 "Condemned to the use of words, we can
never expect mathematical certainty from our language."76 More im-
portantly few judges enjoy freeing otherwise guilty defendants on
what is perceived by the layman as a "technicality," and it is not likely
that these same judges enjoy confronting the legislature in such a di-
rect manner.
The United States Supreme Court is free to determine due process
requirements. The problem with Hoffman Estates is not so much
what it does, but how it does it. The Court could have forthrightly
73. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982).
74. Even if Hoffman Estates is the law, see State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 391, 363
N.W.2d 507, 513 (1985) (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting), in which Chief Justice
Krivosha calls Hoffman Estates "unsupported" and "an anomaly."
75. Nebraska's difficulty with defining careless driving is a case in point. In State v.
Hoffman, 202 Neb. 434, 275 N.W.2d 838 (1979), the court held Nebraska's careless
driving statute void for vagueness. A district court ruling that the subsequently
enacted careless driving statute suffered from the same infirmity was reversed in
State v. Merrithew, 220 Neb. 530, 371 N.W.2d 110 (1985).
76. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
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said that criminal statutes that do not implicate first amendment
rights are not subject to facial review. Instead of taking the shortest
distance between two points, the Court circled around the back.
77
Perhaps uncomfortable with the major revision of due process ju-
risprudence it was undertaking, Hoffman Estates hedged the applica-
tion of the "vague in all of its aspects" rule. "These standards should
not, of course, be mechanically applied. The degree of vagueness that
the Constitution tolerates-as well as the relative importance of fair
notice and fair enforcement- depend in part on the nature of the en-
actment."7 8 The Court recognized that a statute which arguably im-
plicates activity protected by the constitution is subject to a more strict
analysis.
The Nebraska Supreme Court made an error in applying the Hoff-
man Estates rationale, but it compounded the error by misapplying
the Hoffman Estates approach. Because it did not look seriously at
whether the disorderly conduct ordinance was broad enough to en-
compass constitutionally protected activity,79 the court's analysis of
the vagueness issue was necessarily flawed. Even under Hoffman Es-
tates, a statute that has never been authoritatively construed so as to
limit its chilling effect on protected activity can be challenged facially.
But since the court looked only at Groves' conduct, it did not even
consider "whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of con-
stitutionally protected conduct."0
In ignoring the threat that sweeping disorderly conduct laws pose
to constitutional liberties, the court seems to have forgotten that these
laws have been abused in recent American history. In fact, the cur-
rent Supreme Court backlash against overbreadth analysis can largely
be explained by the Warren Court's frequent use of the doctrine to
protect dissent. Disorderly conduct statutes were, and are, frequently
used to punish and harass racial minorities, political protesters, the
unfortunate and the nonconforming.8 1
77. Perhaps one factor which helps to explain the strained analysis of Hoffman Es-
tates is that the ordinance in question regulated the sale of drug paraphernalia.
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates 455 U.S. 489, 491 (1982). The stu-
porous jurisprudence that occurs in the context of illicit drugs has been noted
elsewhere. See, e.g., Snowden, A Holistic Jurisprudential View of the Drug Vic-
tim, 54 NEB. L. REV. 350, 379 (1975) ("It is indeed ironic that it is not dope but fear
that threatens the rationality of the legal system and society that stand as the
guardian of freedom.").
78. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 64-72.
80. State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 385, 363 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1985) (quoting State v.
Frey, 218 Neb. 558, 561, 357 N.W.2d 216, 219 (1984)).
81. The U.S. Supreme Court heard four different cases in five years in which orderly
black protesters were charged with a "breach of the peace" in Louisiana. In each
case the convictions were reversed. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (sit-in
at "whites only" public library); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (protests
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The Omaha disorderly conduct ordinance is overbroad as well as
unconstitutionally vague. It thus chills exercise of protected first
amendment rights, provides inadequate notice and lends itself to arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement. When purportedly analyzing
the potential overbreadth of the ordinance, the court baldly stated
that Groves' conduct was unprotected. Yet it seems obvious that
Groves was exercising his right to express displeasure to those who
were exercising dominion over him. One of the benefits of truly free
speech that has been long recognized is the opportunity to vent one's
anger and frustration with the government. The author of a recent
treatise has dubbed this function of free speech "the safety valve func-
tion."8 2 The rationale behind encouraging the disenchanted to unbur-
den themselves was expressed in a concurring opinion by Justice
Brandeis, in which Justice Holmes joined:
But [those who won our independence] knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and pro-
posed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
8 3
Appellate court judges are accustomed to principled and articulate
argument, but some, perhaps most, of our citizens cannot meet those
standards. And there is no reason to require them to. In Cohen v.
California, the Court reversed a conviction for disturbing the peace
based on the petitioner's wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words
"Fuck the Draft."84 While not approving of that "unseemly
epithet,"85 the Court was able to discern that fundamental values
were offended by its suppression.
Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it
is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily
ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we
to affirm the judgement below. For, while the particular four-letter word be-
ing litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is
nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we
think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled dis-
tinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual.
8 6
The State of Nebraska disliked the taste and style of Mr. Groves
from the beginning. He was originally charged with trespassing and
carrying a concealed weapon, as well as with disorderly conduct, but
against arrests of fellow demonstrators); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962)
(sit-in at bus depot waiting room reserved "for whites only"); Garner v. Louisi-
ana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (sit-in at "whites only" lunch counter).
82. M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 1.04.
83. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
84. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
85. Id. at 23.
86. Id. at 25.
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was acquitted of the more narrowly defined trespass and weapons
crimes.S7 The manner in which the Nebraska Supreme Court ignored
the essential nature of Groves' constitutional challengeSS demon-
strates the court's orientation toward reaching the "right" result; they
wanted this guy badly. It is useful to compare Groves to Fowler v.
Nebraska Accountability & Disclosure Commission,S9 in which over-
breadth and vagueness challenges were raised to a law which reached
protected first amendment activity. Fowler had been assessed a civil
penalty under the Nebraska Political Accountability and Disclosure
Act, which provided that "Campaign statements... shall not be...
used by any person for any commercial purpose, for soliciting contri-
butions, ticket sales or other political campaign purposes, or for har-
assment by a governmental body or any other purpose."9 0 Engaged in
a hotly contested race for the state legislature, Fowler had mailed
questionnaires to political action committees that had supported his
opponent through financial contributions.91
The holding of the court in Fowler is perfectly consistent with a
belief that overbreadth cases in Nebraska are decided entirely with
reference to the "merits," i.e., the social and economic characteristics
of the individual challenging the law, rather than the law itself. The
court held that the statute "as it was applied in this case, places an
impermissible burden on protected speech and must fall as being over-
broad."92 Turning to the vagueness analysis, the court focused on the
word "harassment." The opinion noted with dismay that the defini-
tion of harassment depended on the subjective values of the victim.93
It then looked to Coates v. City of Cincinnati,94 a case relied on by
Groves and cited by Chief Justice Krivosha in his Groves dissent. The
opinion quotes heavily from Coates. "Conduct that annoys some peo-
ple does not annoy others. Thus the ordinance is vague, not in that it
requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but compre-
hensive normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard
87. Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985).
88. See text accompanying notes 55-72.
89. 213 Neb. 462, 330 N.W.2d 136 (1983).
90. NEB. REv. STAT. § 49-14,132 (1978).
91. Fowler v. Nebraska Political Accountability & Disclosure Comm'n, 213 Neb. 462,
463, 330 N.W.2d 136, 137 (1983).
92. Id- at 467, 330 N.W.2d at 139. A statute, of course, cannot be "overbroad as ap-
plied" in a particular case. It is simply unconstitutional as applied. On the other
hand, an overbreadth challenge goes to the facial validity of the statute and is
unconcerned with the individual before the court. However, a court must look to
authoritative construction of the statute in order to determine if it is overbroad.
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). This is the import of the court's
statement.
93. Fowler v. Nebraska Political Accountability & Disclosure Comm'n, 213 Neb. 462,
469, 330 N.W.2d 136, 140 (1983).
94. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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of conduct is specified at all."95
In comparing Fowler with Groves, one is drawn to the conclusion
that a statute is definite enough if applied to individuals the court dis-
approves of and with whom it does not identify. The requirement of
the statute held unconstitutionally vague in Fowler-that one's con-
duct be "annoying"-is the identical actus reus of Omaha's disorderly
conduct ordinance held not vague in Groves. The court's inconsistent
statutory construction highlights the most offensive aspect of standar-
dless laws-the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment. A system of laws in which ad hoc standards are set by the
individuals who enforce them is nothing more than a police state. The
cases are filled with statements denouncing those laws as creating a
government of men and not of laws. 96 There is ample sociological evi-
dence of the disparate effect these laws have on minority groups.97
No community can call itself free when its lowliest members are
subject to harassment at the whim of its police force. This form of
oppression is all the more undesirable because it generally takes place
below the perceptive horizon of more conventional members of soci-
ety. The gravity of the evil, and our responsibility for it, are com-
pounded when we neither see nor care.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE "FIGHTING
WORDS" PROBLEM
The seemingly settled relationship between the "fighting words"
doctrine and the first amendment requires a new approach. Drafting
more modern penal codes does little to improve the situation when the
goals of the statute are either undefined or clearly open to constitu-
tional objection.98 However, a new technique called "focused balanc-
95. Fowler v. Nebraska Political Accountability & Disclosure Comm'n, 213 Neb. 462,
470, 330 N.W.2d 136, 141 (1983) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614 (1972)).
96. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) ("Where the legislature fails to pro-
vide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless
sweep [that] allows a policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections.' ") (quoting Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)) (brackets in
original). See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972)
("Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance-poor peo-
ple, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers-may be required to comport themselves
according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and
courts.").
97. See authorities cited in Stormer & Bernstein, The Impact ofKolender v. Lawson
on Law Enforcement and Minority Groups, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 105 (1984).
98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 (1980) is an example. While the model ordinance is




ing," set forth by Professors Farber and Nowak in a recent article,9 9
offers one method of approaching the traditional "fighting words"
doctrine.
The thesis of the Farber and Nowak article is that restrictions on
speech, which are based both upon its content and upon the time,
place and manner in which it is communicated, constitute a hybrid
form of speech restriction. The authors argue that public forum anal-
ysis leads to incorrect results in these circumstances because it fails to
focus on the central considerations: freedom of speech and govern-
mental interests. They propose an analysis they call "focused balanc-
ing" to apply to situational restrictions, "which are defined as
restrictions keyed to content but applicable only in limited con-
texts."100 The proposed test has three components. The first is an ar-
ticulation requirement that would place the burden on the
government desiring to restrict speech in a particular context to artic-
ulate its goals at the time a statute is passed.101 As visualized by Far-
ber and Nowak, this would differ from the typical situation where
government attorneys create and assert state interests after a citizen
has already been charged with the offense. There also seems to be an
inherent assumption that requiring a government to define permissi-
ble and impermissible speech in a given context, and to articulate the
goals that these contextual regulations serve, may in many cases cause
these goals to evaporate before the limitations ever achieve the status
of law. Many state interests cannot stand the scrutiny which that test
would require. "Requiring the government to proceed through clear,
explicit regulation also prevents ad hoc administrative decision-mak-
ing under the guise of situational regulation from becoming a cover for
outright censorship."'10 2 The fertile imaginations of attorneys can fre-
quently create rational interests which were not the actual primary
goal of the lawmakers. This first phase of the focused balancing ap-
proach requires legislators to confront free speech interests they
might otherwise be ignorant of or ignore.
A second, closely related step in focused balancing is that the ar-
ticulated goals be consistent with free speech values. Although this
seems implicit in the articulation requirement, Farber and Nowak be-
lieve this would make lawmakers consider whether the contextual
limitations are viewpoint-neutral.103
Finally, if the contextual regulation passes the first two require-
ments, it must still be shown that the importance of the governmental
99. Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature ofPublic Forum Analysis: Content and
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984).
100. Id. at 1243.
101. Id. at 1242.




interests outweighs the effect on speech. The goal must be important
enough to justify the contextual limitations. The regulation must be
reasonably likely to attain these goals.104
Professors Farber and Nowak perhaps did not consider that stat-
utes which punish fighting words are themselves hybrids of the tradi-
tional categories of content-based restrictions and time, place and
manner restrictions. They are apparently comfortable with viewing
"fighting words" as a category of permissible content-based regula-
tion.105 One reason for letting this particular sleeping dog lie is that
the categorical approach has made overbreadth analysis in the fighting
words context easier, at least as Farber and Nowak see it: "Because
proscription is allowed only for specifically defined categories of
speech, a particular statute's scope can be easily compared with the
permissible categories." 106
I would argue that the categorical content-based approach to the
fighting words doctrine is "easier" because it oversimplifies interests
and issues which are not as clear as they may at first seem. In fact,
fighting words statutes create the same difficulties in drawing lines as
the public school speech cases with which Farber and Nowak concern
themselves. These difficulties arise because a statute which punishes
speech based on potential audience reaction is as much a "hybrid" of
content and time, place and manner regulation as those statutes which
regulate certain types of speech only in public schools.
A system of analysis that views speech which incites a violent reac-
tion as merely a category of permissible content-based regulation is
grossly over-simplified. If Mr. Groves had called his best friend a
"fuckhead" and a "motherfucker" in jest over a couple of drinks, he
would not be punished for using fighting words because it is recog-
nized that using those words in that time, place and manner could not
possibly harm significant governmental interests, whatever they
might be. Assuming that there are legitimate governmental interests
in "keeping the peace," we may be reasonably certain that these inter-
ests are not threatened by the light-hearted use of profanity between
friends. It is also clear that profanity itself cannot be constitutionally
proscribed without reference to the circumstances in which it is
used.107
Thus, a statute which punishes the use of language, which under
the circumstances is reasonably certain to incite violence, does not fit
neatly into the categorical exception to the general prohibition against
104. I&
105. Id at 1228 n.44 ("Although one might create separate categories for the 'fighting
words' or 'hostile audience' restrictions, we include within the same category all
speech that creates a clear danger of a violent reaction to the speaker.").
106. Id at 1229.
107. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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content-based discrimination. Nor is it merely a time, place and man-
ner regulation. The fighting words doctrine has elements of both and
can be usefully analyzed using the focused balancing approach.
The Omaha ordinance would fail under all three of the factors con-
sidered in focused balancing. Most seriously, the Omaha City Council
did not articulate the goals which it sought to achieve. Nor did it
clearly state what constitutes disorderly conduct and what does not.
Looking at the ordinance on its face, it seems clear that the goal
was to provide broad discretionary powers to deal with any kind of
disagreeable behavior that the political majority wished to punish.108
This approach is frightening as well as unconstitutional. As an early
Nebraska case recognized, "'[ilt is not permissible to enact a law
which, in effect, spreads an all-inclusive net for the feet of everybody
upon the chance that, while the innocent will surely be entangled in
its meshes, some wrongdoers also may be caught.' "109
A law-making body can, and must, hire police officers to enforce
the laws. It cannot, however, abdicate its responsibility to determine
what is and is not prohibited. This principle was most eloquently
stated by Justice Black in his concurrence in Gregory v. Chicago:
Since neither the city council nor the state legislature had enacted a narrowly
drawn statute forbidding disruptive picketing or demonstrating in a residen-
tial neighborhood, the conduct involved here could become 'disorderly' only if
the policeman's command was a law which the petitioners were bound to obey
at their peril. But under our democratic systdm of government, lawmaking is
not entrusted to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his
beat. Laws, that is valid laws, are to be made by representatives chosen to
make laws for the future, not by police officers whose duty is to enforce laws
already enacted and to make arrests only for conduct already made criminal.
One of our proudest boasts is that no man can be convicted of crime for con-
duct, innocent when engaged in, that is later made criminal. To let a police-
man's command become equivalent to a criminal statute comes dangerously
near making our government one of men rather than of laws. There are am-
ple ways to protect the domestic tranquility without subjecting First Amend-
ment freedoms to such a clumsy and unwieldy weapon. 110
Any court leaning toward invalidating a disorderly conduct statute
would want to consider the result of that action. Would the public
welfare of Omaha, Nebraska have decayed rapidly absent the protec-
tions of its disorderly conduct ordinance? The answer is, certainly, no.
Had the statute been invalidated, the City Council probably would
have enacted a more narrowly drawn statute adequate to keep the
peace. The underlying issue here is whether "domestic tranquility" is
108. Similarly broad ordinances extend the reach of the Omaha Police even further.
See, e.g., Porta v. Mayor of Omaha, 593 F. Supp. 863 (D. Neb. 1984) (loitering
ordinance upheld against overbreadth and vagueness challenges).
109. State ex reL English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 340, 281 N.W. 607, 610 (1938) (quot-
ing Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 10 (1927)).




a significant interest, or at least one significant enough to endanger
some of our fundamental concepts of liberty. I believe there is no fun-
damental interest in peace and tranquility, and that even if there
were, modern society would be plainly incapable of protecting that in-
terest. People who fight are properly punished under laws pertaining
to assault, not under disorderly conduct laws. Any less serious breach
of the peace ought to be dealt with in a more informal manner. If my
neighbor's raucous party disturbs me, there are effective remedies
available to me which do not involve calling the police. I can attempt
to reason with him to make him see that if he ignores my wishes I will
go out of my way to ignore his. When his party keeps me awake all
night, he can be sure my lawnmower will keep him awake all morn-
ing. Even if I feel unable to negotiate personally with my neighbor,
the police can do this for me. Police officers carry the symbolic au-
thority of the state and are therefore highly effective at resolving dis-
putes through informal means short of invoking institutions like the
courts. Disorderly conduct statutes might make police-work easier,
but they do so at an unnecessarily high social cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not fairly address the issues
raised by the appellant in Groves. Instead of addressing the facial va-
lidity of the challenged statute, the majority focused on the acts of the
defendant. When a court determines standing to raise a facial chal-
lenge based upon its feelings about that individual, first amendment
values are flagrantly violated.
The court should have strictly scrutinized the disorderly conduct
ordinance before it since the law was designed to give police officers
broad authority. Had the court undertaken that analysis, the uncon-
stitutional aim of the statute would have become apparent.
Finally, disorderly conduct statutes and similar statutes are unnec-
essarily duplicative of more narrowly defined statutes. Most acts that
come under the category of disorderly conduct can be better dealt with
on an informal basis.
Matthew P. Millea, '87
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